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I. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations that are 
solely determinative of the issue on appeal. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. CVTS FAILURE TO PROVIDE MRS. JOHNSON WITH REASONABLE 
ADVANCE NOTICE OF ITS INTENT TO REQUIRE STRICT COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE TERMS OF ITS NOTICE OF DEFAULT IS FATAL TO ITS ABILITY 
TO SUMMARILY FORFEIT MRS. JOHNSON'S INTEREST IN THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT. 
1. The No-Waiver Provision in the Lease Agreement Could Be Waived, and Was 
in Fact Waived. Bv CVI. 
CVI concedes that it agreed to relax, and in fact relaxed, die fifteen day cure period 
specified by its Notice of Default. (Response Brief at 8, 9 and 13.) It does so by 
acknowledging that it accorded Mrs. Johnson "a tremendous amount of indulgence," engaged 
in a "pattern" of "try[ing] to work with [Mrs. Johnson]," and "allowed Mrs. Johnson a degree 
of tolerance." (Id.) In an effort to escape the obvious characterization that its agreed-upon 
forbearance constitutes a waiver of its right to require strict and immediate compliance with the 
Notice of Default, CVI invokes the no-waiver provision of the Lease Agreement. (Id. at 13, 
14.) CVI's reliance on that provision, however, is misplaced. 
1 
"It is a well-established rule of law that parties to a written contract may modify, waive, 
or make new terms notwithstanding terms in the contract designed to hamper such freedom." 
Prince v. R. C. TolmanConstr. Co., 610 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 1980) (quoting Davis v. Pavne 
&Dav. 348 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah I960)). As this court has stated, f,[p]arties to a contract may, 
by mutual consent, modify any or all of a contract, even if the contract itself contains a 
provision to the contrary." Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
The rationale for this principle is that " . . . there is nothing so sacrosanct about having 
entered into one agreement that it will prevent the parties entering into any such change, 
modification, extension or addition to their arrangement for doing business with each other that 
they may mutually agree." PLC Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish & Chips, 502 P.2d 562, 
563 (Utah 1972). Thus, 
While parties to a contract are free to [ignore its provisions], they 
must also understand that they may bear the consequences of such 
disregard when breach becomes a fact of life. As a general rule, 
if the parties mutually adopt a mode of performing their contract 
differing from its strict terms, or if they mutually relax its terms 
by adopting a loose mode of executing it, neither party can go 
back upon the past and insist upon a breach because it was not 
fulfilled according to its letter. 
Ouinn Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien Const., 597 P.2d 945, 951 (Wyo. 1979) (emphasis in 
original). 
2 
Numerous commentators and other courts have recognized that contractual provisions that 
purport to eliminate the possibility of the parties' waiver are not enforceable. According to 
Professor Corbin: 
In like manner, a provision that an express condition of a promise 
or promises in a contract cannot be eliminated by waiver, or by 
conduct constituting an estoppel, is wholly ineffective. The 
promisor still has the power to waive the condition, or by his 
conduct to estop himself from insisting upon it, to the same extent 
that he would have had this power if there had been no such 
provision. 
3A Corbin on Contracts. § 763, p. 531 (rev. ed. 1960). 
The Utah Supreme Court endorsed this principle in Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co.. 146 
P.2d 284 (Utah 1944). In that case, the parties entered into a contract for the purchase and sale 
of an automobile. The contract contained both a time of the essence provision and a no-waiver 
provision. Several of the buyer's payments during the first twelve months of the contract were 
made as much as 30 days late. After accepting the first 12 payments, the seller rejected the next 
payment on the basis that it was too late. Shortly thereafter, the seller repossessed the 
automobile and sought a deficiency judgment against the buyer. In affirming the trial court's 
decision that the seller had waived strict compliance despite the existence of the no-waiver 
provision to the contrary, the court stated "the provision that a waiver of any breach of the 
contract shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any subsequent failure of strict compliance with 
any and every term of the contract, as well as any other term of the contract, could be modified 
3 
by agreement of the parties." 146 P.2d at 286 (quoting Beardslee v. North Pacific Finance 
Corp.. 296 P. 155, 158 (Wash. 1931)). 
Numerous other courts in a multitude of jurisdictions have reached the same result. 
Fisher v. Tiffin. 551 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ore. 1976) (a "non-waiver provision of the contract can 
itself be waived by the conduct of the vendor."); Sagson Co. v. Weiss. 374 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 
(N. Y. 1975) ("a no waiver clause of this character does not apply to a claim of waiver by open 
possession."); Searoad Shipping Co. v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.. 361 F.2d 833, 837, 
n.18 (5th Cir. 1966) ("Corbin makes very clear that neither the parol evidence rule [citation 
omitted], the statute of frauds [citation omitted], nor express provision in the written contract 
against waiver by subsequent oral agreement or conduct [citation omitted] prevent the 
introduction of evidence that a party to the contract by subsequent conduct or agreement — oral 
or written — waived a condition to its performance of the contract."); Bettelheim v. Hagstrom 
Food Stores. 249 P.2d 301, 305 (Cal. 1952) (presence of no-waiver provision in contract can 
itself be waived). 
These principles belie CVI's claim that because the Lease Agreement contains "an 
unequivocal non-waiver provision," CVI was incapable of waiving its right to require Mrs. 
Johnson to comply strictly with the Notice of Default. (Response Brief at 7, 13.) The mere 
presence of the no-waiver provision cannot insulate CVI from the reality that by its conduct CVI 
relaxed - waived - its right to require Mrs. Johnson to comply strictly and immediately with 
the terms of the Notice of Default. In the final analysis, the no-waiver provision cannot be used 
4 
as a type of legal alchemy to magically transform conduct that plainly constitutes waiver to 
conduct that the law overlooks. The district erred in failing to recognize this principle. 
2. None of the Cases on Which CVI Relies to Justify Its Forfeiture of 
Mrs, Johnson's Interest in the Lease Agreement on Less than Five Davs 
Advance Notice Remotely Supports the Trial Court's Decision. 
The record in this case is undisputed that "right around the end of July [1993]", CVTs 
manager told Mrs. Johnson " . . . we could not work with her any longer and that we would be 
evicting if things didn't get going at the end of July," see Tr. at R. 750, 751, and that less than 
five days later on August 3, 1993 — one day after it accepted Mrs. Johnson's rent payment check 
- CVI served Mrs. Johnson with its Notice of Termination. (Tr. at R. 655, 700, 704, 706.) 
In an effort to justify the legal sufficiency of this plainly limited amount of time, CVI cites two 
principal cases which it contends supports its position. Those cases, however, either actually 
support Mrs. Johnson's claim or are readily distinguishable from the facts of this case. 
For example, CVI places considerable reliance on Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart. 195 P.2d 
748 (Utah 1948) (Response Brief at 9-15.) However, in that case, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a period of twenty-three days for a buyer to finally cure its default after a two year period 
of "many lenities" from the seller was reasonable. 195 P.2d at 751. By contrast, in the case 
at bar, Mrs. Johnson had less than five davs to cure after the previous seventy days of "lenities." 
There is no Utah case that upholds the legal sufficiency of such a brief final cure period. 
Moreover, nothing in Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah. Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 
1976) supports CVI's position. (Response Brief at 15, 16.) There is no indication that the 
5 
lessee in that case ever raised the claim or defense that the notice of forfeiture that the lessor 
served five months after the expiration of the initial thirty day cure period violated the legal 
requirement that the lessor provide reasonable advance notice of its intent to require strict 
performance.1 In the case at bar, Mrs. Johnson has in fact raised this issue.2 The district court 
erred in not applying it to the undisputed facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For nearly fifty years, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that once a promisee 
relaxes the requirement of strict compliance, it cannot insist unilaterally on such performance 
without providing its promisor with reasonable advance notice. (See Opening Brief at 8-11). 
This settled principle of contract law has been applied consistently to prevent a promisee from 
unfairly exploiting its promisor by suddenly and unexpectedly demanding immediate strict 
performance after a lengthy period of forbearance. Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah 
App. 1987); Morris v. Svkes. 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981); Tanner v. Baadsgaard. 612 P.2d 
345, 347 (Utah 1980); Fuhriman v. Bissegger. 375 P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 1962); Pacific Dev. Co. 
1
 CVI itself recognizes that the lessee in that case never raised the claim that Mrs. Johnson has asserted in this 
case when it states "[i]t must be assumed that the lessor in Pingree neither intended nor indicated that it would waive 
its right to declare forfeiture." (Response Brief at 15) (emphasis added). Nothing in Pingree supports that 
assumption. 
2
 CVI appears to imply that Mrs. Johnson never adequately raised or preserved this issue for appeal. (Response 
Brief at 8, n.4). That implication is unfounded. The trial transcript clearly reflects that this issue was the principal 
focus of Mrs. Johnson's case at trial. (See generally Tr. at R. 687-704, 746-760.) It also reflects that it was the 
principal focus of Mrs. Johnson's counsel's motion to dismiss after the completion of CVI's case in chief and his 
summation. (See generally R. at Tr. 764-74, 791-94.) The issue was preserved in both Mrs. Johnson's Docketing 
Statement and in her response to CVI's Motion for Summary Affirmance. Finally, it was clearly identified in Mrs. 
Johnson's Opening Brief. (Opening Brief at 7-11.) 
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v. Stewart. 195 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1948). The trial court committed reversible error in 
refusing to apply this fundamental principle of contract law to the undisputed facts of this case. 
This Court accordingly should reverse and vacate CVTs Judgment and remand the case with 
instructions to enter Judgment in favor of Mrs. Johnson for all attorneys' fees and costs that she 
incurred to enforce her rights under the Lease Agreement. 
DATED this /«/ day of July, 1995. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
>hn T> Anderson Joh  
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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